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Croatia’s government, led by Zoran Milanović, is now into its last year in power before elections
scheduled for the start of 2016. Will Bartlett writes on the government’s economic record. He
argues that Milanović’s decision to continue with the previous government’s policy of ﬁscal
consolidation has had dismal consequences for the country’s economy. The only hope is that if
growth resumes in the EU it will pick up the Croatian economy along with it.
The Croatian government led by Zoran Milanović has been in power for over three years. During
this time, the economy has been subject to a continuing recession, having experienced negative
GDP growth over the entire period, as shown in Chart 1 below.
Chart 1: Real annual GDP growth, Croatia and EU-28 (2006-14)
Source: Eurostat online data
The downturn has had serious social consequences. The unemployment rate has almost doubled from the low of 9
per cent in 2008 to a new peak of 17 per cent in 2013. A similar pattern has aﬀected youth unemployment, which
had increased to around 50 per cent by 2014. In the words of the European Commission, this has placed a “strain
on the social fabric”, while low employment rates are damaging growth prospects. This poor economic performance
indicates deep structural problems and diﬃculties in adjusting the economy in the wake of the initial recession, and
raises questions about the appropriateness of economic policy since then.
1/6
Policy response to the crisis
Since it came to power in December 2011, The Milanović government has continued on the track of ﬁscal
consolidation announced by the previous government. The aim of the government has been to shift towards an
investment led model of growth, while simultaneously reducing the tax wedge (taxes and social contributions on
labour) to encourage employers to hire more workers. Additional reforms in the labour market and to social
contributions were to be introduced to provide additional incentives to the supply side of the labour market.
In its ﬁrst budget in 2012, the new government announced cuts to the wage bill, to subsidies, and to health
spending. VAT was increased by 2 per cent combined with a 2 per cent reduction in social health contributions
designed to ease the burden of social contributions on wages and boost employment. A personal income tax
allowance was introduced for low earners, while a 12 per cent tax was introduced on proﬁts and dividends,
measures designed to change the balance of taxation away from labour and towards capital.
These measures represented a continuation of economic policy of the previous HDZ government combined with
some modest redistribution elements. However, the initial aim to boost investment was overshadowed by the
decision to continue with the previous government’s policy of ﬁscal consolidation, which, by reducing public
expenditure at a steady 1 per cent per year, removed purchasing power from the economy and undermined all other
attempts at stimulating growth. The inevitable result has been a continued deterioration of the economy, and all
projections for recovery that were predicted by the government’s macroeconomic forecasts have been continuously
downgraded – as shown in Chart 2 below.
Chart 2: Government forecasts of growth have been constantly downgraded over time
Note: Dashed lines indicate forecasts. Source: Economic and Fiscal Policy Guidelines,
Ministry of Finance, Zagreb; various years as indicated.
Policy measures within the EU – the excessive deﬁcit procedure
2/6
Soon after Croatia joined the EU in July 2013, the Milanović government had to cede eﬀective control over many
aspects of economic policy to the European Commission. The EU had adopted a system of “new economic
governance” in 2010 in response to the Eurozone crisis. As a member state, Croatia became immediately involved
in the annual “European Semester” that begins in November with the publication of an Alert Mechanism Report
(AMR) for all EU member states.
The AMR of November 2013 stated that Croatia had a “severe macroeconomic imbalance” that required further
investigation through the process of an In-Depth Review (IDR). Even before the results of the IDR were announced,
Croatia was placed in the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure (EDF) in January 2014. From that point on, the most
important instruments of economic policy were eﬀectively taken away from the independent responsibility of the
Croatian Government and handed over to the European Commission.
The IDR, published on 5 March 2014, identiﬁed a range of serious problems including large external liabilities,
declining export performance, highly leveraged ﬁrms and fast growing government debt. It also revealed that state
owned companies had not been restructured, were highly indebted and were only weakly proﬁtable, that Croatia has
the lowest employment rates in the EU, and that the business environment ranks below the average of all the EU’s
post-communist states.
On 24 April, Croatia submitted its 2014 National Reform Programme and Convergence Programme to the European
Commission. The latter outlined the budgetary strategy to correct the excessive deﬁcit by 2016, reducing the deﬁcit
from 4.9 per cent of GDP in 2013 to 3 per cent of GDP in 2016, to meet the EDF target. The Commission responded
in June 2014 with a set of recommendations that heavily criticised the Convergence Programme for basing the
forecasts on overly optimistic projections of economic growth in the forthcoming years. Overall, it assessed that
additional eﬀorts would be needed in order to comply with the recommendations under the EDP to correct the
excessive deﬁcit by 2016.
In November 2014, the Commission issued its fourth annual Alert Mechanism Report . The report’s conclusions on
Croatia’s economy were that macroeconomic imbalances remained a “serious concern”. The AMR found that the
large negative net international investment position had improved slightly because the current account had returned
to a surplus due to falling domestic demand and investment.
However, low investment was undermining economic recovery and Croatia was steadily losing its share of the global
market. It also assessed that unit labour costs and the real eﬀective exchange rate were starting to rise again,
putting any gains made in improving competitiveness at risk. Furthermore, the contracting economy and the high
budget deﬁcits had put the public debt to GDP ratio on to a rapidly rising trend.
Labour market policy
One of the key concerns of the European Commission has been the poor performance of the labour market,
especially for the youth and for older workers. An increasing number of young people are neither in education,
employment nor training, while the proportion of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion has increased to
levels signiﬁcantly above the EU average. Policy makers have therefore stressed the importance of structural
reforms designed to make the supply side of the economy more ﬂexible in the hope of stimulating economic growth.
New laws on Social Welfare and on Pension Insurance adopted in January 2014 have restricted social beneﬁts,
raised the pension age, encouraged pensioners to take up part time employment, increased penalties for early
retirement, tightened criteria for the receipt of disability beneﬁts, extended the maximum period of ﬁxed term
employment contracts, and made it easier for employers to dismiss probationary workers. The aim of making the
labour market more ﬂexible has been to enable a positive employment response in case of an economic upturn.
Unfortunately a ﬂexible labour market can also have the opposite eﬀect during an economic slowdown, magnifying
the extent of job losses. Supply-side policies are unlikely to have a positive eﬀect in conditions where aggregate
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demand is insuﬃcient to bring the economy to a position where capacity constraints are beginning to bite. From that
point onwards a more ﬂexible labour market and a more ﬂexible economy can have the eﬀect of releasing the
supply constraints that might otherwise hold back growth.
However, after ﬁve years of recession, it can be stated with some certainty that the Croatian economy is far away
from its full capacity constraint. The danger of continuing with such a policy will be that the capacity constraint
actually shrinks to meet the lower level of aggregate demand, and that the lower level of output and productivity
engendered by the long recession may become a permanent feature of the Croatian economy.
Attracting foreign direct investment
During the pre-crisis boom period, new foreign direct investment (FDI) to Croatia reached a high point of US$6
billion in 2008. Since then, as in most other peripheral European economies, the inﬂow of FDI has come to an end.
The supply of foreign capital has diminished as a consequence of the economic crisis and investors are more
concerned to reduce risk by investing in safer options such as cash and the government bonds of safe countries.
Chart 3: Foreign direct investment (US$ million)
Source: UNCTAD online data
Along with the reduction of the inﬂow of foreign investment, foreign investors already in the country have become
less willing to reinvest their proﬁts in order to expand capacity and increase productivity. As can be seen from Chart
4, proﬁt reinvestment by foreign investors turned negative after the onset of the crisis in 2009, indicating that
substantial sums were actually leaving the country rather than being reinvested in the economy. Only recently has
the situation recovered in the ﬁrst two quarters of 2014, perhaps indicating the beginnings of a return of conﬁdence,
and a positive eﬀect from Croatia’s EU membership.
Chart 4: Foreign investors’ reinvestment of proﬁts
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Source: Croatian National Bank online data
In order to promote foreign investment, the government introduced a new foreign investment Law in 2012. The new
law reduced the minimum initial investment amount and created special conditions for micro-entrepreneurs;
introduced a new investment category for investments in high value- added activities; increased the subsidies for job
creation; provided special treatment for investment projects that created more than one hundred new jobs; and
changed the method of calculating the amount of the initial investment.
Despite the enactment of this law, foreign investment continued to plunge in 2013. There were some signs of a
recovery in the ﬁrst half of 2014, but this has probably been due more to Croatia’s entry into the EU than to the
provision of special ﬁnancial incentives and privileged market conditions for foreign investors.
Conclusions
Overall, the Milanović government has had a rather dismal record in relation to the management of the economy,
which has continued to languish in recession for a far longer time than almost any other European country. By 2014,
the economy had suﬀered from ﬁve years of recession, unemployment had been continually increasing, and few
economic indicators had shown positive news.
The principal reason for the recession has been the decision to impose pro-cyclical ﬁscal consolidation on an
economy hard hit by the global crisis. While the onset of the economic crisis can plausibly be placed on outside
factors, principally the shock induced by the global ﬁnancial crisis and subsequently to the spill-over eﬀects of the
Eurozone crisis, the inability of the Croatian economy to recover from these shocks indicates serious problems of a
deep-seated structural nature and that government policies have not yet been suﬃciently eﬀective.
When the Milanović government came to power in 2011, it held a fairly progressive policy aim of rekindling
economic growth and creating a more equal society. This was to be achieved through an investment programme to
raise capacity and improve productivity, and some redistribution to the lower wage earners that would boost
consumption and aggregate demand.
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Unfortunately, in the priority given to ﬁscal consolidation few of these plans came to fruition. While these aims
remain a valid policy option for emerging from the recession, they are unlikely to be fulﬁlled within the scope of the
EU’s Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure. One must hope that growth resumes in the EU, and that this will lift the Croatian
economy along with it, and also that the capacity of the economy to respond to such a future opportunity will not
have been too greatly diminished by the policies adopted over the last ﬁve years by successive governments.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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